

UHON 390 Small Wars & Counterinsurgency - Fall 2008

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208 East Hall -- 677-5571

101 Arts & Sciences -- 677-5221

Course Time and Place:

This course meets in Old Main 202 on Tuesdays and Thursdays from 12:30-1:45 p.m.

Office Hours:

Mondays, Thursdays and Fridays from 9-10:30 am in East 208, although you can arrange to see me anytime. I will be in one of my offices almost every day. Give me a call. If I'm in, chances are we can meet.

Required Readings:

- Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*. (1937)
- Robert Taber, *War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare*. (1965)
- Colonel C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*. (1896)
- David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. (1964)
- United States Army and United States Marine Corps. *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*. James F. Amos and David H. Petraeus. (2007)
- Course Packet (available from Barnes & Noble), which includes:
 - Karl von Clausewitz, *On War* (1832) - Book I; Book VIII
 - Che Guevara, *Guerrilla War* (1961)
 - Carlos Marighella, *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (1969)
 - Thomas X. Hammes, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette* (September 1994): 35-44.
 - Thomas X. Hammes, "Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges," *Military Review* (May-June 2007): 14-23.

Additional Course Resources:

- United States Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (1940) [25.9MB download]
<http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/SWM/1215.pdf>
- U.S. Gov't Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative Library - <http://www.usgcoin.org/library.cfm>
- *Small Wars Journal* - <http://smallwarsjournal.com/>

Course Description:

Since the end of conventional military operations in Iraq in the spring of 2003, the United States armed forces have faced a persistent insurgency. That insurgency has resulted in over 30,000 American casualties, fostered political divisiveness in the United States, and has created an uncertain future for Iraq as a nation state. The same instability applies to Afghanistan. In the last two years, the once-vanquished Taliban have re-emerged as a potent military force capable of destabilizing the Kabul government and are the core of a growing insurgency. Many politicians, journalists and commentators have approached this as a novel problem, but the concept of "small wars" and the counterinsurgency efforts that try to put them down is an old one, with a long and distinguished literature created by practitioners on both sides of the question. This seminar will first explore the nature of guerrilla warfare in both theory and practice and then do the same with counterinsurgency. The course will culminate in a multi-week role-playing exercise that will pit members of the seminar against each other as they try to accomplish specific goals.

Course Requirements:

You will only get out of the seminar what you put into it. You are all adults, and I would hope that you have chosen this seminar because the topic grabbed your interest. To that end, I will not serve as your surrogate parent, pushing you to do something you don't want to do. At the very least, I expect each student to keep up with the schedule of readings that appears on this syllabus. There are a total of 300 points to be earned

in this class, distributed as follows:

- For the first 2/3 of the semester, student moderators will play an important role in most of our course meetings. The semester reading schedule (found below) lists days when two moderators will lead class discussion of the reading. Each moderator will write a 5-7 page summary and analysis of that day's readings in his/her best rendition of the Queen's English, worth 50 points. Each student will serve as a moderator twice during the semester, so there are 100 points at stake here.
- For the most part, this is not a lecture course; we will rely heavily on class discussion to make the seminar work. In the interest of promoting spirited class discussion, you can earn up to 50 points for your oral contributions to the learning process between 09 September and 04 November. (Please recognize that I understand the difference between quality and quantity when it comes to discussion.)
- The final third of the semester will be devoted to our Afghanistan 2008 simulation, which is explained in more detail below. On 11 December, each of you will turn in an 8-10 page analysis of counterinsurgency in the context of your character's role in the simulation, supported by appropriate primary source materials. Your written analysis (conforming, of course, to the highest of stylistic and grammatical standards) will be worth 100 points.
- Over the course of the simulation, which will run from 13 November to 09 December, you will each have continual opportunities to express your character's point of view and attempt to achieve hidden objectives. You can earn up to 50 points for your oral performance (soundly supported, of course, by your understanding of the primary materials) throughout the simulation.

Your course grade is determined by your average and is based on a standard 10-point scale.

Semester Reading Schedule:

The reading schedule will be flexible as needed.

04 SEPT:	Introduction to the Course
09 SEPT:	Clausewitz, Book I - Student Moderators: TBD
11 SEPT:	Clausewitz, Book VIII - Student Moderators: TBD
16 SEPT:	Mao - Student Moderators: TBD
18 SEPT:	Guevara - Student Moderators: TBD
23 SEPT:	Marighella - Student Moderators: TBD
25 SEPT:	Taber, ch. 1-6 - Student Moderators: TBD
30 SEPT:	Taber, ch. 7-11 - Student Moderators: TBD
02 OCT:	Mini-simulation or role-playing exercise
07 OCT:	Callwell, ch. 1-11 - Student Moderators: TBD
09 OCT:	Callwell, ch. 12-19 - Student Moderators: TBD
14 OCT:	Callwell, ch. 20-27 - Student Moderators: TBD
16 OCT:	Galula - Student Moderators: TBD
21 OCT:	Debate Preparation
23 OCT:	Class Debate – Resolved: “In any conflict between an established nation-state and an insurgency, the nation-state has an inherent advantage over the political and military resources of the insurgency.”
28 OCT:	Hammes - Student Moderators: TBD
30 OCT:	Counterinsurgency Field Manual, ch. 1-5 - Student Moderators: TBD
04 NOV:	Counterinsurgency Field Manual, ch. 6-8, Appendices A-E - Student Moderators: TBD
06 NOV:	Setting up the simulation
11 NOV:	No Class - Veterans Day
13-25 NOV:	Simulation
27 NOV:	No Class - Thanksgiving
02-11 DEC:	Simulation

The Role-Playing Exercise:

On October 7, 2001, the United States and Great Britain attacked Taliban targets in Afghanistan with cruise missiles and airstrikes. The attacks were a response to ongoing support for Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda terror network responsible for the September 11 attacks in New York City. Shortly thereafter, the first American ground forces were committed and played an important role in the ouster of the Taliban. Although removed from power and badly battered, the Taliban retained enough organizational efficiency to remain an ongoing threat.

In the spring of 2003, the United States and its allies launched a conventional ground invasion of Iraq, based largely on faulty intelligence that indicated an active Iraqi chemical and biological weapons program as well as a link between the Iraqi government and al-Qaeda. The conventional war ended quickly but was replaced by an active insurgency that bedeviled the United States and its allies for the next five years. To fight the insurgency, the United States shifted armed strength from Afghanistan to Iraq as part of a larger “surge” and began active counterinsurgency efforts under the leadership of General David Petraeus.

Observers have credited the shift to counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq with stabilizing (to some degree) the situation there, but have also noted a corresponding decrease in stability in Afghanistan. By the summer of 2008, a resurgent Taliban and al-Qaeda had made Afghanistan an increasingly dangerous and unstable place. While Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks and American deaths have declined in Iraq, they are on the rise in Afghanistan. The Afghan capital of Kabul is increasingly isolated and insurgent control over rural parts of the country has grown.

NATO efforts to stabilize the situation have not been particularly effective to date. A June 2008 Government Accountability Office report noted that although the Pentagon and State Department have spent \$16.5 billion in Afghanistan, there is still no “sustainable strategy” for improving the effectiveness of the Afghan Army or police force. Opium production has risen significantly, with many of the profits from the resulting narcotics going to fund insurgent activities. Insurgent attacks have successfully targeted loci of government influence, especially schools; 590 closed because of intimidation threats in 2007, up from 350 the year before. Clearly, something has to be done.

In an effort to bring stability to the situation, several key stakeholders have decided to form the Afghan Stability Working Group (ASWG). ASWG is responsible for the conceptualization, planning and implementation of a strategy designed to restore stability to Afghanistan and the surrounding region. How that happens will depend in large part on how ASWG organizes itself and chooses to proceed.

Here is what we know about the environment in which the simulation takes place:

- The course instructor (referred to hereafter as The Omniscient One) will oversee the game and may make periodic adjustments but will not be an active participant. Over the course of the simulation, you will receive regular news bulletins, communiqués, and directives that will further define the situation. Some information will go to all participants, and some will go to selected participants.
- The Omniscient One will assign a role to each student in the class and one or more objectives for each role. Some objectives may be public and some may be secret.
- Your goal as a player is to do everything you can to achieve your assigned objectives. You should not assume that your initial objectives are permanent. This is a living, breathing exercise, and we do not necessarily know what turns it might take. Based on your character's interaction with the others, you might find that your objective no longer makes sense or seems logical to you. In that case, you are free to alter your objective, but you must do so in the context of the current situation in Afghanistan. It is also entirely possible that The Omniscient One will contact you part of the way through the simulation and change your character's objectives, perhaps even swearing you to secrecy about your new mission.
- The structure, leadership and procedures for ASWG will not be determined in advance. Instead, you

will design all of that at your first meeting (the first full day of the simulation). Come prepared to argue on behalf of an arrangement that best meets the objectives of your role, keeping in mind that subtlety can be just as effective as direct action.

- Over the course of the simulation, your character may earn Power Cards from the Omniscient One. These Power Cards allow you to initiate or respond to acts of violence (either publicly or privately) to varying degrees. Damage inflicted or received will be determined by a dice roll.

Possible character roles may include but are not limited to:

- Afghan Army representative
- Afghan government representative
- Afghan police representative
- Afghan regional warlords
- Afghan provincial representatives
- US Army Central Command representative
- US State Department representative
- US Agency for International Development representative
- Pakistani military liaison
- NATO Alliance representatives (either civil or military)

Other things to keep in mind:

- To be successful, it is important that you conduct yourself in an informed manner. That means you will need to do a lot of extra research about your character and where he/she fits into the context of the current situation in Afghanistan. (It also would not hurt to understand where your potential adversaries and allies are coming from.) To that end, you should apply what you've learned about small wars and counterinsurgency from your readings and class discussions as well as the Additional Course Resources from your syllabus. Feel free to use any other resources you can find.
- This is a learning exercise in which passions may rise and tempers might flare. Keep in mind that everyone is playing a role, and that those roles are put on hold when we leave the classroom. You should be passionate about achieving your character's objectives, but only when you are in character. Let's keep it civil!
- You can work with whomever you want in trying to achieve your objectives. How you do that is up to you. Successfully playing this game will probably require that you work together outside of class.
- Small Wars and counterinsurgencies can get very messy very fast. Given your background and upbringing, you probably have certain moral and ethical convictions. To make the simulation work, you must assume the moral values and ethics of your role, which means that you might be making arguments that would otherwise be reprehensible to you. You do not have to believe what you argue, but it is in your best interest to make it as persuasive as possible.

Resolution of the situation in Afghanistan via this simulation is possible but not necessarily probable. We will devote the final class period of the semester to talking through the game, revealing hidden agendas and objectives, and assessing what we now think we know.

Statement on Disabilities:

Any student who feels s/he may need academic accommodations or access accommodations based on the impact of a documented disability should contact and register with Disability Services during the first week of class. Disability Services is the official office to assist students through the process of disability verification and coordination of appropriate and reasonable accommodations. Students currently registered with Disability Services must obtain a new accommodation memo each semester. For more information:

Ernetta L. Fox, Director
Disability Services, Room 119 Service Center

(605) 677-6389

Web Site: www.usd.edu/ds

E-mail: dservices@usd.edu

Freedom in Learning:

Under Board of Regents and University policy student academic performance may be evaluated solely on an academic basis, not on opinions or conduct in matters unrelated to academic standards. Students should be free to take reasoned exception to the data or views offered in any course of study and to reserve judgment about matters of opinion, but they are responsible for learning the content of any course of study for which they are enrolled. Students who believe that an academic evaluation reflects prejudiced or capricious consideration of student opinions or conduct unrelated to academic standards should contact Dr. Doug Peterson, Director of the University Honors Program, to initiate a review of the evaluation.

College of Arts & Sciences Plagiarism Policy:

The College of Arts and Sciences considers plagiarism, cheating, and other forms of academic dishonesty inimical to the objectives of higher education. The College supports the imposition of penalties on students who engage in academic dishonesty, as defined in the "Conduct" section of the University of South Dakota Student Handbook. No credit can be given for a dishonest assignment. At the discretion of the instructor, a student caught cheating or plagiarizing may be:

- Given a zero for that assignment.
- Allowed to rewrite and resubmit the assignment for credit.
- Assigned a reduced grade for the course.
- Dropped from the course.
- Failed in the course.

KEEP THIS SYLLABUS AND REFER TO IT OVER THE COURSE OF THE SEMESTER.
WHEN IN DOUBT, ASK QUESTIONS.

Revised 2 September 2008